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CIVIL AFFAIRS II^0I12.IATI0N GUIDE 
The French Police 


H and A Ho* I 69 S 


16 Uay 1944 


Note:' Draft not yet approved by the Editorial 
Committee on Civil Affairs Studies 


Prepared for the 

CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION 

VYAl *. DAPAI iTI JjliT 


by 


Research and Analysis Branch 
Office of Strategic Services 













TABI£ OF COKTDKTS 



3um:.-ary 


.9. ««•.». o.a..»<>.o. «».€>..« o.s.e.. 


Page 


• iv 


I a Polio e of the Th ird Republic..... 1 

A. Polio© Organization 0 **..«. .. 1 

1* Main Elements in'Police Administration .... 1 

ulo XiOCOl Police ©o.c. 9 ... oooooa«3oaoo 2 

b 0 Government-Controlled City Police ...... 2 

Co National Police . ...» 2 

do Military Police ......... 3 

2. Control of Police ...a «.•••• 3 

Bo Operations of the French-Police 4 

1 o Maintenance of Orddr .. 4 

2o Detection of Criminals 6 

a. Agencies of Detection ......... ...... „.. 6 

bo Oral Examination of Suspects ........... 7 

e. Scientific Methods o.................... 8 

3a Collection of Information 8 

C. Personnel of the French Police ••••••••••..••• 9 

1 o Costume 9 

2 3 Selection M.... 10 

3o Education .. 10 

4o Number .................................... 10 

) O X -'.tleS eoo.«..*.oao..oaa*.(>a«..«..A.aa«.«o« 11 


Ila The French Police tinder Vichy ..... 11 


A. 


Bo 

C o 

D. 


Modifications in the Republican Police System. 
1. German Influence on the French Police ..... 
2o Purging and Subordination of the Military 

Police o.ao.ctooe.sii* n.eo.o. .9.09. o.joooo.o 

3 © x. ho National & oXxcq .ob........... a........ 

&« Creation of Regional Police .o... o o.. 
5. Eationalization of City Police ............ 

6„ Local Police 

7o Auxiliary Policemen .. 

8 0 Police Schools ... 0 .................. e ..... 

Supremacy of the Police: a Vichy Innovation . 
1« The Militia ..o.c.•<>*•.c««..<»..©*e.e .«>©...• 
2© Concentration of Police Control 


Operations of the Vichy Police'•o«• 
Personnel of the Vichy Police ... 


11 

11 


12 

14 

15 
17 

17 

18 

19 

20 
20 
21 
22 
24 
































XIIo Security Problems of the Liberation 



A. Organisational Problems ............... ... 25 

lo Police Formations which Are'Kostile to the 

Allies. . ... . .... 25 

2o Format ions Vhich Hay Be Useful- to the Civil 

Authorities •«..,•••*.. *. ..«..... .«. . 26 

3* Tlie Command of Police Organisations ....... 28 

Bo Personnel Problems ..................... 29 

lo Importance of Police Personnel ... 29 

2o Eliminating Unsafe Personnel .. 30 

3» Recruiting Hew Personnel .o...» 0 e... a °.o 0 «*o 30 

4e Use of Foreign Personnel .. 31 

Co Ability to Maintain Order 32 

lo Dimensions of the Problem ».o.. e ...32 
2o Factors Affecting the Result • 33 

a» Humber of Police ..... 33 


bo nationality of the Police •••••• 33 

Co Power over Personnel 33 

d o Equipment o.a.«»ae.9eooe..*08..oo»'.>.*a.o 33 






































































































































> 









































































Summary 


1. The re-establishment of order after the liberation 
will be a task of immense difficulty* It can easily fail 
unless the civil authorities have at their command ample and 
well-equipped police forces staffed with loyal Frenchmen. 

2. The Third Republic possessed police forces which 
were adequate to maintain order and efficient in the repression 
of crime. They were the local police of the communes, the 
government-controlled police of the largest cities, a national 
police force, and military police forces which supplemented 
the work of civilian police. There was a gradual movement 
toward centralised control of the police by the national 
government • 

3. During the Vichy administration, control of all 
police was centralized under the national government. 
Improvement of police personnel, through the introduction of 
higher standards of admission, training, and compensation, 
was planned but never realized. Many patriotic elements in 
the police were purged, and formations packed with pro-German 
personnel were created. 

4. Notwithstanding the centralization of formal con¬ 
trol, many segments of the police remained lukewarm or 
antagonistic to Vichy politics. This attitude, together with 
popular resistance to pro-German police and pro-German regula¬ 
tions has brought about a virtual breakdown of law and order 
under Vichy. 









under Vichy, Prior to 1934. it was called the General Safety 
Administration ( direction de la surete gen^ral e ); from 1934 
to 1941, the National Safety Administration ( surete nationale ); 
and since then, National Police Administration ( police n ationale ), 
d. Mi1itary Polic e, France has traditionally employed 
military formations in functions which would he performed in 
English-speaking countries by civilian police* Under the Third 
Jiepublic, the military units employed in this way were the 
following; 

The Amy Gendarmes ( gendarmerie, sometimes qualified as 
nationale , terrestriale * or departeinentale ). who patrolled rural 
highways and assisted local police to quell disorders. 

The Naval Gendarmes ( ge ndamerie nar 11i me), who policed 
the principal ports and harbors. 

The lie publican Guard ( ga rde re publi caine ), which served 
as a presidential bodyguard and in other ceremonial functions. 

The Mobile Republican Guard ( garde republicaine mobile) 
often called simply the Mobile Guard, which was called upon in 
serious Disorders, such as those provoked by strikes. 

2«, Control of Police . Almost all the police forces of 
Republican France were subject to control from a variety of 
sotirces. In the local police, most of the personnel were 
hired by the mayor but could be fired only by the prefect. 

The chiefs and deputy chiefs of police ( commissaires centraux, 
and commissaires ) were appointed and dismissed by the Minister 
of the Interior, A local chief of police might be ordered by the 






































4 


mayor to put mere man on the patrol of markets, by the prefect 
to improve the patrol of streets, arid by the district attorney 
( procureur de la_ Republlque) to investigate a particular crime* 
lie would also receive general instructions on procedure from 
the office of the national government police* He was bound by 
all these orders, and had to reconcile them as best he could. 

In the government-controlled police forces of the larger 
cities, powers of hiring and firing were divided between the 
departmental prefect and the Ministry of the Interior. The 
mayors (except in Paris), the prefects, end the district 
attorneys all bad claims on the services of these police. 

Powers over the national police were largely centralized 
in a director-general* But one branch of the national police 
force, the Mobile Police, was also subject to orders from the 
attorneys-general ( procureurs generales ) of the various appeal 
districts. The latter officials could also requisition the 
services of the Gendarmes and of the Mobile Guard although 
these groups were subject to the Minister of War with respect 
to appointments and dismissals. 

B* Operations of the French Police 

The principal functions performed by the- French police 
v/ere maintenance of order, detection of criminals, and collec¬ 
tion of information. The last function has come to be regarded 
in recent years as independent of the other two. 

1. Maintenance of Order , The French distinguished 3harply 
between what they called the “preventive 1 * function of the 















5 


police — control of crowds, direction of traffic, inspection 
of amusements, and the like -- and the "repressive" function 
of criminal detection. Officials charged primarily with pre¬ 
ventive functions were described by different and confusing 
nameso Hie classic term was "administrative police" ( polic e 
administrative ) ; but the term "administrative"was also used 
to designate the branches which supervised personnel, finance, 
and equipment. In the Paris police force the preventive force 
was known as the "municipal police" (police municipals ), but 
this was also a technical term to describe those police forces 
which were under the control of the communes. After the 
reorganization of 1941, the preventive forces became known as 
"security police" ( police de la s ecurite ). Police d*ore re — 
the police who keep order — is probably the best of the terms 
that has been evolved. 

Under the Republic, maintenance of order was primarily a 
function of the uniformed patrolmen ( gardieris de la paix ), 
aided in emergencies by the Gendarmes or the Mobile Guard, 

The job was apparently well done and occasioned little criticism, 
except for the practice of "preventive arrest." This procedure 
consisted in seizing persons believed likely to provoke riots, 
and detaining them until the danger was past, without filing 
formal charges. It was illegal in France, as in the United 
States (where it is also used at times), and was widely con¬ 
demned by Frenchmen, 





































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2 o Detec tion of Criminals. , 

a. Agencies of Detection * The primary responsibility 
for the detection of ordinary criminals fell upon the detective 
bureaus of the urban police forces, commonly called “judicial 
police” ( police .judicialre ) or “safety police” ( police de la 
surete ). These bureaus were highly developed in the cities 
which had government-controlled police forces; that of Paris 
was as powerful as the National Safety Administration, and 
there was a vigorous rivalry between the two. In the cities 
having only local police forces crime detection lagged, and in 
the rural communes it was notoriously weak. 

A nation-wide detective agency was supplied by the 
National safety Administration ( direction do la surete national e). 
To aid the local police. It established its Mobile Police ( police 
mobile ) in various regions and tracked down criminals who 
operated over a wide area. It also maintained sections to 
handle peculiarly national problems, such as railway robberies, 
international crime rings, subversive conspiracies, and financial 
swindle s * 

On the whole, the French police were exceedingly efficient 
in the prosecution of crime. Occasional failures, as in the 
Stavisky cose which precipitated the fall of a cabinet, had 
far greater political consequences than v/ould be expected In 
the United States, 


















Oral Examination,of Suspects , Th© art of interrogating 
suspects and witnesses was highly developed among the French 
police * They did not aim to obtain a confession, since it had 
little legal validity, but to gather more evidence for a complete 
picture of the crime 0 

This practice, which is followed by American police, 
often without legal sanction, was expressly authorized in 
France,, The authority to conduct oral examinations with 
written minutes which are admissible in evidence, was con¬ 
ferred by law on many officials, including rural Constables, 
officers of the Gendarmes and of the Llobile Police, chiefs 
of police. Justices of the Peace, Examining Judges ( juges 
d v instruction ) and members of the parquet or public minis try „ 
Officials having this statutory power were designated as 
"Judicial Police" ( police judiciaire ) 0 In this sense, the 
"Judicial Police" were a quite different body of men than those 
constituting the detective bureaus which were known by the same 
name o They might be more aptly called "police examiners,," 

The authority to take testimony varied somewhat according 
to circumstances and the rank of the officer involved * Vfcile 
the Examining Judges had plenary powers of investigation, 
police officers were ordinarily limited to taking the voluntary 
statements of disinterested witnesses^ But in cases of 
"fresh pursuit" of crime ( flagrant dellt ), witnesses might be 
summoned and the suspect interrogated by chiefs of police. 
District Attorneys* and others« 



















- B - 


As in other countries, oral examination was not 
restricted in practice to those having legal authority to 
perforin it* and "third degree" methods were occasionally usedo 
But extensive powers conferred by lav; on the French police made 
it possible for them to achieve a high degree of efficiency in 
criminal detection without necessarily exceeding their legal 
boundso Prolonged interrogations, which might have impressed 
an American or Briton as abusive, were entirely proper under 
French !aw 0 

0a Scientific Iiethod3 e The better organised forces of 
the large cities, and the national police forces* neglected 
none of the modern police techniques,, Paris, for example, 
had chemical and toxicological laboratories, and the best 
fingerprint index in France, not excepting that of the 
National Safety Administration,, French bureaus of identification 
( bureaux de 1°i&sntite judiciaire ) persisted in the Bertillon 
method of identification by piiysical measurements after its 
disuse in other countries, but they did use fingerprinting,, 

In addition to scientific techniques, the French police 
sometimes employed the age-old method of getting "tips" from 
informers ( indicateurs ) who were themselves members of the 
underworld* This alliance of law with outlaxvs was bitterly 
condemned by French critics of police administration under the 
Third Republic„ 

3o Collection of Information , In the collection of information 
















for general reference, the police had gone much further 
in France than in English-speaking countries, or perhaps than 
in any other democratic nation*. Not only were files kept on 
the development of political parties, labor unions, and other 
organizations 9 but also on all individuals who had any importance 
in public life. From these files, the government in power 
could and often did obtain exhaustive information about its 
opponentso This phase of informational activities, therefore, 
became known as "political policing" ( police politique ), and 
was vehemently denounced by many commentators on French 
government * 

The collection of information was performed chiefly 
by the Section of Inquiries and Investigations ( section des 
informations et enquetes ) in the Rational Safety Administration, 
by the General Information Administration ( direction des 
renseignement s generaux ) in the Paris Police, and by the 
detective bureaus of other large cities* 

C» Personnel of the French Police 

1. Costume . No uniform was worn by most of the office 
employees and detectives 0 In Pari$ patrolmen wore uniforms 
which consisted of a dark blue coat or cape, dark blue trousers 
with red stripes on the sidep B and military-type caps ( kepis ) 
which had flat tops, straight sides, a silver badge, and silver 
stripes indicative of rank. Similar uniforms were worn by 
patrolmen in other cities. 






















- 10 - 


-i I, ■ - 


The various branches of military police were distinguished 
from the civil police by their lighter colored "gendarme-blue" 
trousers, which contrasted xyith their black coats and black 
Sam Browne belts Q Their caps also were of military type with 
black sides and blue tops* They had summer uniforms of khaki* 
and showy full dres3 uniforms, including plumed helmets, fc-r 
paradeso 

2o Selection , Selection of policemen in the rural communes 
and smaller cities followed no fixed rules and was often tinged 
with the politics of the local mayoro In the larger cities, 
particularly those whose police forces were government-controlled* 
and in the National Safety Administration, educational pre¬ 
requisites and competitive examinations had been installed,. 

The merit system was somewhat encumbered by rules preferring 
war veteranso Tie military police were chosen by the army 
from its own ranks» 

3„ Education ,, In addition to the educational prerequisites 
for admission to the force, Paris and Lyon maintained excellent 
police schools in collaboration with the universities of these 
citieSo The establishment of a national police school under 
the National oafoty Administration was contemplated by a law 
of 1934* but it had not yet materialised when war broke out 
in 1939o 

4« Number o Complete data on the number of police in the 
Third Republic are not available* The total personnel of all 
forces probably exceeded one hundred thousand„ The largest 














units were the Pax*is police numbering about seventeen thousand, 

the Gendarmes numbering about the same* and the Mobile Guard, 

which counted about twenty thousand troopers© 

5o Titles 0 The various names by which members of the French 

police were called can be conveniently summarized by a list 

giving their approximate English equivalents 0 

Chief of police, police 
commissioner 

Deputy or district chief 
of police 

Captain ' 


Lieutenant 
Sergeant 
Corporal 

Policeman, patrolman, 

"o op ** 

Detective, "dick," 
"snooper” 

II. Ti- A FRLIICE PQLICA TJKDZ.1 VICK Y 
A© Modifications in the Republican Police System 

Nearly every branch of the French police system has been 
radically overhauled by Vichy, and new.branches of police have 
been introduced© The principal changes are summarized under 
the headings below© 

1„ Gorman Influence on the French Police © According to 
the terns of the armistice,, the French police, even in the 
occupied zone* remained under French control© But German 


Commissalre centrale 


Cammissair e, commissaire 
^"srron*rrsseinent 

Inspect eu:r r chef des gardiena 
c!eTa p aix, or Tnspocteur ,. 
cKeUK ae la sureY e 

Soua-inapecteur 

Brigadier 

Sous^brigqdier i 

Agent, gardien de la naix fi 
"ilia" 

Ap.ent de la stirete , inspecteur , 
'‘"roussln,” "nou churl ” 





































police formations ware maintained for the protection of German 
military forces and were accorded the right of arresting anyone 
offending or menacing the occupying power<, They could # there¬ 
fore , threaten to seize or search if the French police failed 
to aet 9 and the armistice commissions could demand that "order” 
be maintained more effectually for the benefit of the Germans* 
Consequently* they established an effective surveillance of 
French police activities, and directives of German military 
authorities had to be carried out by French police officials. 

In unoccupied France, the sovereignty of Vichy did not 
prevent infiltration of the Gestapo, which had planted numerous 
agents long before the invasion of Southern France in November 
1942» After that, time, German military police and the 33 
were reported active throughout France, and Gestapo offices 
were openly maintained in the chief towns of most of the depart¬ 
ments, Apparently, Gestapo pressure on French police xyas first 
applied indirectly through the armistice commissions and through 
the administration at Vichy, But the Gestapo grew rapidly 
bolder, making immediate demands on local police officers* In 
the fall of 1943, Vichy advised its local police officers to 
cooperate freely with Gestapo inspections and to respond 

i 

frankly to Gestapo inquiries, 

2° Purging and oubordination of the Military Police 0 
Under Vichy, as under the Third Republic, the military police 
were the symbolic protectors of the nation against its enemies 
from within and without• 









- 13 


The Republican Guard ( Garde Hepublioain e) g which had 
appeared as a presidential escort on formal occasions, was adopted 
by Pd'tain as his own guard* Since the Republic ms dead, the 
icort was renamed the Marshal's Guard ( garde du marechal ; 
also called garde Retain ); its members, who had formally taken 
oaths to defend the Republic % were now required to swear 
to defend Petain* At about the same time, its membership was 
reduced from three thousand to two hundred; only those, regarded 
as loyal to the Vichy regime were retained* In 1943» an increase 
in the membership of the Marshal*s Guard was authorised, but 
vacancies were apparently filled with pro-Vichy men rather 
than with former guardsmen* 

The Mobile Guard of the Third Republic ( Garde I,lob li e 
Hep u blioaine ) was disbanded in the occupied sane of France, 
but continued operations in the Gouth zone* Its name was 
changed to the "Guard 0 " It ceased to be the governments 
principal organ for suppressing outbreaks of violence; new 
organizations of Vichy origin —* the Mobile Reserves and later 
the Militia — became more conspicuous in this field* The 
guard appears to have assisted these organizations in a sub¬ 
ordinate capacity* Reports on the Guard’s loyalty are con¬ 
flicting* 

The Gendarmes have maintained their former organization 
relatively intact, due principally to the difficulty of 
replacing units so accustomed to maintaining order and to 
policing the highways in rural areas* They have given decided 

































■* 14 — 


evidence of loyalty to the cause of an independent France 0 
The Gendarmes failed so signally to suppress the raaquls 
that much of thi3 work had to he taken over by the Militia. 
Speaking of a particular Gendarme brigade, a Resistance 
representative declared: ^It deserves we 11 of the country, 
as it facilitates by every means the hiding of defaulting 
workers and the work of the patriots„ tf Their liberationist 
spirit is probably traceable in part to their military back¬ 
ground, most of them having -been members of the regular 
army and permeated with hatred of the Germans „ 

3o The national Police 0 Through a succession of laws 
and decrees dating from April 1941* the National Police 
organization greatly increased its power and influence 0 
Formerly known as the Surete Rationale » it now took the name 
of Rationale » The'change of name served to emphasize 

the expansion of its activities — formerly detective or informa¬ 
tional in the main -- to include the raaintenance of order, and 
the implementing of policies of the Rational Revolution. 

Upecial services to stamp out secret societies and communism, 
to restrict the activities of Jew$ and to regulate travel and 
communication were established 0 A Public Security Service 
( Service de la Security Publiquo. ) was set up to coordinate 
and reinforce the activities of local and regional police in 
maintaining order; it also commanded the new Mobile Reserve 
Groups ( Groupes Llobiles de Reserves ) a which were to serve 
as shock troop3 in suppressing riots or strikes 0 Qiis formation 





















commonly called the GNR, thus displaced in large measure the 
Hob lie Guard , a military police unit which had performed, similar 
functions in the past, but which apparently proved insufficiently 
loyal to Vichy to be continued as a key organ* The GHR is 
decidedly collaborationist, and has an authorised strength 
of nearly twenty thousand men* 

Cider branches of the National Police continued to exist — 
the Service of Territorial Surveillance ( surveillance du 
terr.itolre ) „ the Detective Service ( police judlcialre ). and 
the General Information Administration ( direction des 
re ns e i gnene nt 3 g eheraux ) a Their members are reported to have- 
retained their devotion to French independence; despite Vichy 8 s 
wishes, those sections which in pre-war times were charged 
with spying on fascist or other pro-German activities have 
continued to do so — particularly the Territorial Surveillance 
and one of the detective sections known as Anti-National 
Hoveinents (m enee s antlnatlonales )* 

In 1944 the National Police became part of a still 
larger concentration of nation-wide police control, described 
below* 

4o Creation of Regional Police „ Although the National 
Safety Administration was said by some writers to stand at 
the apex of the police system of the Republic„ this relationship 
was more evident on organizational charts than in practice* 

The local police of most of the communes were much more directly 
controlled by the mayors than by the Director of National 






















. 



. - 










- 16 


Safety* and the Paris Prefect of Police was in many respects 
core powerful than the Director* In an effort to bridge the 
xvlde gap between national and local police* and to make the 
latter more responsive to national direction* Vichy established 
regional police« 

The establishment of regional police xvas a part of the 
reorganization of all local government along regional lin^s, 
undertaken by the Vichy government in 1941* 'Vith respect to 
the police* the regional system had two aspects 0 First* there 
was a force of Regional Police* with one branch for the main¬ 
tenance of order ( police de la secunite ) t one for criminal 
detection ( polio 5 de la surete , or police .fudlciaire ), and one 
for information fr enaeignemonts genera tor) „ All three branches 
were enabled to operate throughout the region, which consisted 
of several departments* 

Second J} a great deal of power was lodged in the chief 
of the Regional Police, called the Police Intendant ( Intendant 
de la p olice ) or Intendant to Keep Order (inte ndant du n airtien 
de 1 ;; ordre ) a As head of the Regional Police* he could act 
directly to enforce the law throughout the region* and also 
to spy on local officials, including the prefects* and report 
on their loyalty to the Vichy government» Vhat was more 
important was his power to direct the activities of local 
police throughout the area; the prefects' police powers became 
subject to the superior command of the intendant* The mayors' 
powers of appointment and control also passed to the Regional 

















































. 





- 17 - 


Intendant in all communes with more than ten thousand inhabitants<> 
In this way, police of all but the smallest centers became in 
effect government•controlled police — police d»etat . 

Early in 2943» n further step was taken in building 
up the intend ant ? s powers in the regions of northern and western 
France which had been part of the original "occupied zoneV* 

The old organization of police by communes was discarded; in 
the new organization, all local police in these areas were 
organised by regions, under the intendants,' The regions were 
divided into ,r di3bricts, " which were usually co-extensive with 
departments, ar.d the districts into "circumscriptions," each 
of which included one or more communes 0 The intendant was 
entrusted with practically all the powers which the prefect 
and mayor had shared under the Republic 0 

5o n ationalization of City Police » In the first stage of 
police reorganization, in 1942, a number of local police forces 
of cities in the occupied zone were nationalized, as had been 
done in some of the largest cities under the Third Republic 0 
These government-controlled police ( polices d* etat ) were soon 
swallowed up In the 1 arger units of regional police described 
above. The older nationalized police forces of Paris, Lyon, 
and Marseilles remained unaffected* 

6* Local Police o In the "unoccupied zone" of France, the 
local police were but little affected by Vichy innovations„ 


























- 13 - 


The immunity to reform which had characterized then for a 
hundred years under the Republic served then in good stead 
under the National Revolution* Even the lav/ establishing 
Regional Police which purported to bring them under the 
orders of the Intendant* provided that the mayors* powers of 
appointment and dismissal should remain unaffected in towns 
with a population of less than ten thousand, ITor do reports 
indicate that the regional police, who are fully occupied 
with more acute problems* have concerned themselves greatly 
•with the police operations of small communes» 

Except for pro-Nazi higher officials* the attitude 
of the local police has been marked by indifference or 
opportunism* They did not oppose collaboration while Germany 
was victorious* but neither did they vigorously repress resistance Q 
while they will probably take no great risks for the Allies, 
they are unlikely to oppose the liberation* and may be expected 
to cooperate with the authorities who are set up after the 
Germans are expelled* 

7o Auxiliary Policemen * A symptom of the collapse of 
lav/ and order under Vichy has been the necessity which arose, 
chiefly during the summer and fall of 1943, for drafting 
ordinary citizens into police service. The organized Resistance 
xvas so successful during this period in attacks on railroad 
Installations and food stocks that all the regular police 
forces were unable to cope with them*. As a last resort the 
Vichy government ordered local mayors to commandeer the services 



























































































- 19 - 


of ordinary citizens* who were forced to patrol the railway 
lines* especially at bridges and tunnels* to guard the crops 
from sabotage at harvest time, and to protect other objectives,. 
These units, which may be compared with the posses of English- 
speaking countries, were known as "railroad track guards” 

( gardes de3 voie3 ferrees ), and harvest guards ( gardes nessiers ) 0 
The zeal of these untrained and unwilling guardians of property 
oeoras to have been no greater than one would expect and does not 
appear to have checked resistance activities 0 

8c Police Schools 0 The project of a national police school 
which the Republic had planned was realized by Vichy in the 
establishment of an institution at St* Cyr~au-ilont-d*0r* which 
was to compare in excellence with the foremost technical 
schools of the land* including the military academy* In its 
upper division it has trained men to occupy positions as chiefs 
of police ( commissaires ) or higher* A lower, or "technical” 
division trains subaltern personnel* It has been made an 
instrument of the national Revolution* however* and loyalty 
to Pcftain is the foremost prerequisite for admission* 

Vichy has also planned the establishment of regional 
schools to give shorter courses to patrolmen* Schools for this 
purpose are reported to exist at Camp d«Aincourt, Pe'rigueux, 
Fontivy, and Uriage 0 There nay be others. Of those mentioned, 
the last two seem to be devoted to specialized training* The 
school at Perigueux is under German direction and instructs 











* 

■ 







20 - 


In the methods of the Gestapo, The school at TJriago trains the 
membership of the violently pro-Nazi liilitia. 

B 0 Supremacy of the Police: a Vichy Innovation 

As cleavages in Petain f s France opened wider* it 
was no longer enough for the police to be instruments of 
the government* subject to the Ministers of V/ar and of the 
Interior* They had to be made a political force independent 
of the government„ and capable of being used against high 
government officials, if the Vichy autocracy was to survive. 

To some extent, this tendency ms manifested by the creation 
of the Regional Intendants, who could spy on the Regional 
Prefectures, It became much more pronounced with two other 
developments — the creation of the Liilitia, and the concentra¬ 
tion of police control, 

1 0 The Militia * Ostensibly, the French liilitia ( nilice 
franchise ) was to function like the National Guard in the 
United States — to protect the nation against attack from 
any quarter* But it cannot be fully understood without 
knowing something of its history. 

In 1940, Petain dissolved all existing war veterans 9 
associations which were not purely benevolent 8 and sot up the 
now Veterans 9 Legion ( legion des pombattantg )» Sponsored by 
the government, the Legion was supplied with a party line 
which supported Retain and the National Revolution and decried 
a3 outworn the doctrines of democracy. In January 1942, this 











/ 

































v 









' 










- 21 - 


political instrument of collaboration was permitted to found 
a subordinate organization called the S0L o Its full none — 
oG3ryice d * Ordre Legionnaire — might be translated as "Legionary 
Service for Keeping Order 0 ft Hany of its early members came 
from the French fascist group PPF ( Parti Populaire Fran^ais ), 
and its leader ms an outstanding French pro-Uazi, Joseph 
Darnando Although it was associated with the Tricolor Legion, 
which recruited soldiers to fight Russia, the SOL ms more 
concerned with the domestic front. It pursued without 
legal authorization a campaign of counter-terrorism against the 
Resistance and beat up suspected Gaullists whom the police 
had neglected*. 

In January 1943® the government announced the formation 
of a new organization, the Uilitia, under Joseph Darnando 
Actually* the ililitla was made up of former members of the 
SOL* which had become very unpopulai' through its strong-arm 
activities, and which now disappeared. The Llllitia received 
a large government subsidy and trained its members at government 
camps in the use of arms and in methods of guerrilla or anti- 
guerrilla warfare„ By the fall of 1943, units of the Llilitia 
were conducting armed campaigns to stamp out the Resistance e 
Formerly, tills had been done without zeal and without success 
by the Gendarmes* 

2o Concentration of Police Control . Under the Republic 
the military police were commanded by the Secretary of VJar 
(or* in the case of the Ilaval Gendarmes, by the Secretary 
of the IlavyK Other police were under the Secretary of the 













. 









- 22 - 


Interior, or under local officers — chiefly the mayors* The 
legislation of Petain and Darlan in 1941 made no change in the 
control of military police, although It did increase the power 
of the Secretary of the Interior over local forces* 

In 1942, after Laval returned to power in Vichy, and 
while Darlan was still the head of the Ministries of the 
Army and the Lavy, control of the military police was shifted 
from these departments to the Ministry of the Interior, of 
which Laval was the head* Thus Laval was given control of 
nearly forty thousand semi-military forces, in addition to 
the civilian police already under his control,, 

Since the regular army was disbanded, he commanded personally 
most of the armed forces of France« The only important 
exception was the Militia* headed by Darnando 

In January 1944* even this division of power was ended» 
Damand was given a newly-created office — secretary General 
for the Maintenance of Order* lie took over all of Laval’s 
police authority and retained his former leadership of 
the Militia* The economic police, who enforce price and 
rationing rules, were shifted to his control* lie was also 
authorised to establish courts martial for offenses threatening 
the security of the state 0 In effect, he had the potver of 
life and death over all Frenchmen* 

C« Operations of the Vichy Police 

The authoritarian government which Vichy aimed to 
establish required a vast expansion of police activities,, In 

. im^asssxs sr- 































































“ 23 - 


addition to all their former duties, the police were obliged 
to issue identity cards to all the inhabitants of France, and 
to inspect them constantly. They had also to list all the 
Jor/s and Free-msons, and to enforce the special laws pertaining 
to these groups. Police had to be notified of all changes of 
addresso They had to issue psrmits for changes of address to 
foreigners and, in strategic areas, to all inhabitants. Price, 
production, and consumption regulations had to be enforced. 
.Surveillance of political and professional organizations had to 
be increasedo 

During 1940, 1941, and the first part of 1942, the Vichy 
police appeared to be grappling with their increased problems 
fairly successfully* But since the latter part of 1942 
there ha3 been a progressive degeneration and*in the second 
half of 1943, a virtual collapse of law enforcement* widespread 
sabotage has added to their troubles. Riotous disorders have 
taken place in some localities; as a result, police stations, 
streets, and public places have had to be fortified with barbed 
wire* Thefts by night have become so numerous as to require 
special courts, and thefts by day have been committeed by 
citizens impersonating police* Vichy-controlled newspapers 
complain of police timidity, provoked by threats of reprisal 
broadcast by foreign radio stations and by the underground 
papers* One of the Vichy-controlled journals announced late 
in 1943, "The French government cannot put up any longer with 
the murder of police officials and city mayors." 



■ 

. 





** 24 "• 


Personnel of the Vichy Police 

The laws and decrees issued in 1941 for the reforn of 
the police set high standards* both physical and educational* 
for the police staffo Higher officers were to hold university 
diplomas, and to receive technical training in the national 
police school at 3t„ Cyr-au-LIont-d*Or* Subordinate personnel 
vju s to be trained in regional schools* Extensive curricula 
of studies were planned 0 

The scarcity of manpower, together with the unwilling- 
ness of patriotic Frenchmen to enforce Vichy decrees against 
their countrymen s have necessitated "temporary" suspension of 
the high personal requirements 0 Ruffians and criminals have 
beer, accepted, especially in the highly trusted Llobile Reserves 
and liilitiao A shortage of personnel exists despite exemption 
from the labor draft for Vichy police„ 

The police forces of Vichy are believed to be much more 
numerous than these of the Republic e They are estimated at 
more than 135*000* as compared with about 100,,000 before the 
war* A decree of 1943 authorized 25,000 police in the Paris 
force, compared with about 17,000 in 1939* but actual strength 
under Vichy usually falls far short of authorized strength* 

Attempts have been made to relieve the manpower shortage 
by employing women for certain police duties® The numbers of 
policewomen have remained low; the largest group reported in 
any one area is thirty 0 






, 













































«, 25 *= 


The uniform regulations were changed in 1941 so that 
higher police officer's wear black uniforms (like the Germans) 
instead of dark blue* The subordinate personnel continues to 
wear dark blue* apparently without the red stripe on the 
trousers* 

The Vichy police have frequently complained they need 
increased armament to combat the Resistance* but the Germans 
have limited most of them to pistols* Some of the Gendarmes* 
however* have been armed with helmets and rifles for expeditions 
against guerrillas 0 It is reported the Germans plan to 
disarm most or all of the police in the event of an Allied 
invasion. 

Ill • SECURITY PROBLOJ3 OF TITS LIBERATION 
A<> Organizational Problems 

The liberation of France will naturally be accompanied 
by a strong reaction against all the measures which have been 
taken by the Germans and by the government which operated 
under German protection at Vichyo The new civil authorities 
are quite likely to take the view that the Vichy government 
was unconstitutional and its acts void* It will be worthwhile 
to see what effects these trends will have on the existing 
police force t and what changes it may make necessary. 

lo Police Formations Vhich Are Hostile to the Allies 0 
It goes without sayinc that German police organizations > 
the Gestapo* Military Police ( FeldgencLaraerle )» and 33 -- 
will disappear when the Allied armies reoccupy France« Ko 
doubt the German agencies will plant agents in their wake* 












- 26 - 


who will have to be rooted out* 

Certain French organizations created by Vichy have 
been packed with non who can be relied on to oppose the 
liberation of France from the German regime„ The civil author¬ 
ities may be expected to disband these groups and, if possible, 
to seize their arms and their records,. They include: 

a 0 The powerful Uilitia whose pro-Nazi members have 
been entrusted with the Job of hunting out and shooting down 
their countrymen in Resistance movements 0 They are hated and 
despised by patriotic Frenchmen* 

bo The Nobile Reserves viao have been infused with 
doctrines of Hitler 9 s "New Order/ 9 and have been used 
specifically to repress French Resistance 8 

Co Anti-Comiaunist, anti-Jewish * anti-IIasonic units in 
the National Police and in the police forces of Paris and 
other large citie3 0 

In addition* in all branches of the police, personnel 
trained in the new schools of police cannot be trustedo They 
will normally be dangerously anti-Republicon and loyal to 
Vichy* the National Revolution* and the Nazi3 0 

2c. Formations Rhioh Nay Be Useful to the -Civil Authorities » 
Hot all the police formations created by Vichy will necessarily 
be valueless to the civil authorities of liberated France* 

Among those which are likely to be useful* after necessary 
changes in personnel* are the Regional Police* the nationalized 










f 




- 27 


police { police fl *tit at } of some of the largo cities, and the 
posses of railroad and harvest guards * 

The decision to he m&e in regard to these organizations 
will be exceedingly difficult * oinco the Regional Police and 
the government-controlled local police have been organized by 
Vichy for purposes of collaborationist government, they have 
been manned, as far as possible, with fascisticaliy minded men 
who will distrust and even oppose the re-establishment of 
republican government* If the organizations are maintained* 
a substantial restaffing Tri.il be unavoidable; it may be easier 
to abolish them* Moreover, their association with collaboration 
will make them heirs of the hatred which has been directed 
against Vichy and the Eazis* Yet if they are abolished, they 
are likely to be re-established later, in view of the genuine 
needs xvhich these organizations fill* The creation of comparable 
organizations was frequently proposed under the Third Republic* 
Since the posses are not permanent groups but are 
summoned and dismissed according to the needs of the hour,, 
it will be a simpler matter to dispose of them under their 
present names* But the authorities should be prepared for the 
necessity of reviving them, in whatever form proves most 
palatable, for the temporary needs of the country* It seems 
reasonably certain that the shortage of manpower will result 
in a need for supplementing the police, from time to time, 
with ordinary citizens* 


■oreover, various resistance groups 

Q* 



















- 23 *• 


have plans for assisting in the re-establishment of order 
when the Germans are driven out; they might bo effectively 
used as pocsos for special purposes* 

The police schools,, likewise* will probably merit 
continuation after the liberation,, at least the national 
school at St«-Qrr -au-LIont«d* Or . If they are retained,, changes 
in personnel and in program will be necessary. 

3o The Command of Police Organizations 0 The dictatorial 
arrangement under which all police forces are under a single 
head (Darnand)* dissociated from civil administration* will 
call for correction by the restored civil authorities. The 
latter may be expected to abolish the Secretariat for the 
Maintenance of Order* and to make the prefects and police 
chiefs directly responsible to the Minister of the Interior,, 
without the intervention of a super-police commander. Presumably 
the military police vail also be restored to the Ministries of 
Mar and of the ICavy. 

The control over local police by a regional Intendant 
is another feature of the Vichy regime which’may be doomed 
by a return to republican traditions. But this problem is 
part of a larger one — whether the ninety departments 
should bo integrated for all administrative purposes into 
larger "regions.* This broader problem is considered in the 













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- 29 - 


section of the Guide covering Local Government* 

B, Personnel Problems 

Importance of Police Personnel , Following the liberation* 
reliability of police personnel wili assume an importance 
second only to military operations, Pro-German personnel 
can permit disastrous oneiay espionage behind the military 
lineso Anti-German personnel may also have trouble, until 
it has learned to repress the falsification of ration cards 
and the theft of supplies which have hitherto been ignored as 
measures of resistance. Rude and lawless officers can create 
antagonism to the civil authorities. Corrupt, inefficient, 
or indifferent personnel can increase all those dangers. 

The power of French police to help or to hinder the 
civil authorities after the liberation will be even greater 
than ivould be the power of ^nglish and American police. 

Through their informational activities, they have knowledge 
of the attitudes and conduct of all the important figures in 
the country. They also keep files on political and economic 
groups and on movements of foreign origin. Their power to 
arrest and examine witnesses is much less restricted than that 
of British or American police. 

It will be vital to the new regime to have at its 
command police vino are not only honest, but also diligent and 
devoted to the authorities whom they represent. 




































• « 













2* Unsafe Personncl o For a number of reasons, 

It will be impracticable to eliminate undesirable elements 
through tile agency of an investigating commission deliberating 
judicially on the evidence against each member of the force u 
The best evidence will be in the informational files of the 
policeo There v/ill be no time for delay. Attitudes will be 
as important as overt acts. 

The authorities in power v/ill have only one practicable 
courseo They will have to install police chief 3 of unquestioned 
loyalty, and give them authority to dismiss, suspend* or 
transfer to other posts all members of their forces* These 
police chiefs will need immediate access to the police files, 
if they are to protect the government against disorder and 
espionagOo The excesses to which such absolute authority 
night lead in normal times will bo tempered by the acute 
shortage of police manpower; this v/ill operate to limit 
dismissals to the minimum consistent with the security of the 
new regime o 

3o Recruiting hew Personnel * The problem of police 
manpower will be acute for several reasons* I.IIllions of 
Frenchmen are already detained in Germany as prisoners 
or laborers; more will bo taken by the Germans before they 
evacuate* Agriculture and Industry will urgently need workers, 
and the French army will need to increase its numbers 0 

Among the limited manpower available, the police will 
have to select with care those whose attitudes make them 














~ 31 - 


reliable* It will therefore be impracticable to establish, 
in the first instanoe, rigid physical and educational standards* 
It may even be necessary to obtain the release of soldiers for 
regular police duty* A source of personnel which will certainly 
bo used consists of the former members of the police, civil, 
or military, who were dismissed by Vichy on account of anti- 
German sentiments* 

Use of Foreign Personnel * In the immediate zones of 
combat and of communications, it my be assumed that the 
armies of liberation will administer military law through 
their own forces, and that the necessity for this course will 
be recognised by Frenchmen* 7,1th respect to zones which are 
remote from combat, a question of policy will arise* If the 
American, British, and other Allied forces have considerably 
greater reserves of manpower than the French, the use of Allied 
military personnel for policing civilian activities may be 
suggested* 

VVhile the use of non-French military police among the 
civilian population may be required in limited situations, 
undesirable effects may be expected to flow from it a In two 
to four years of occupation, the French have learned the art 
of underground activities* Although they have learned to hate 
Gorman control, their feeling may readily be directed against 
any foreign control* Their suspicion of English-speaking 
people has been carefully nourished throughout the occupation 
by German propaganda* They will naturally expect to police 


themselves 











- 



































































































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- 32 ~ 


0• Ability to I.Iainto,in Order 

1© Dimen s ions of the Problem . The task of maintaining 
order under the Vichy regime was begun with the advantages 
of an established government,, the leadership of a famous 
marshal of France** the armed support of Germany, and negligible 
internal opposition. Nevertheless the maintenance of order 
has degenerated until it has virtually collapsed<, 

The task of the civil authorities after the liberation 
will begin under far loss auspicious circumstances<> The armed 
forces will be fully occupied with the enemy. Hostile groups, 
both French and German, will be at large throughout the country. 
Hear-famlne conditions will exist in some localities until 
relieved by the occupying force. 

Complications will not come solely from the outright 
pro-fascists. Supporters of the new regime, if dissatisfied 
with the official measures taken against collaborationists, 
may attempt to take the lav; into their own hands. r.any loyal 
Frenchmen who have never known rationing except under a 
distrusted government may continue the black market habito 
If there is doubt of the stability of civil authorities, any 
political group which considers itself insufficiently 
represented may attempt to organize violent opposition., 
rinaliy, the criminal profession will have had unequalled 
opportunities, in the disorder under the Vichy regime ana the 
chaos of invasion, to strengthen its organization and its 


armament 







* 33 - 


2a Factors Affecting; the Result Q The result of the civil 
authorities 9 attempt to maintain order will depend in large 
part on factors other than the police * Among these will he 
the consistency with which they are supported by the military 
forces, the degree of confidence which they win from the 
French people £ and the availability of supplies of food and 
clothing to relieve distress. Assuming that these factors 
are reasonably favorable, the needs with respect to the 
police forces may be summarized as follows: 

• a 0 Humber of Police , At the outset s the authorities will 

need police forces which are substantially more numerous than 
those which existed in the same area before the war. After 
order has been re-established p a reduction to the pre-war 
complement may bo practical, 

bo Nationality of the Police „ For the policing of French 
civilians* only French police can be expected to receive a 
high degree of popular respect and cooperation, 

Co Power over Personnel , Officials in charge of the 
police will need wide powers to recruit new personnel B and to 
transfer*, suspend„ or discharge former members of the force, 
do Equipment , The police wall need modern weapons and 
motorized equipmento 










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